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Manipulating Market Sentiment
Michele Piccioney and Ran Spieglerz
March 10, 2016
Abstract
We analyze a simple model of an asset market, in which a large
rational trader interacts with noise speculatorswho seek short-run
speculative gains, and become active following a prolonged episode
of mispricing relative to the assets fundamental value. The model
gives rise to price patterns such as bubble dynamics, positive short-
run correlation and vanishing long-run correlation of price deviations
from the fundamental value. We argue that this example model sheds
light on the question as to whether rational speculators abet or curb
price uctuations.
KEYWORDS: behavioral nance, price manipulation, bounded ra-
tionality, trading rules, speculative trade
JEL number: G02
1 Introduction
One of the main themes in the behavioral nance literature has been the
e¤ect that boundedly rational traders have on price uctuations in nancial
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markets. In seminal papers such as Shleifer et al. (1990a,b) and Hong and
Stein (1999), conventionally rational traders coexist with noise traders
(agents whose trading behavior follows some exogenous stochastic process),
or with agents who follow trading rules, such as fundamental tradingor
trend seeking, based on an incomplete understanding of the market.
A maintained assumption in this literature has been that the market
is competitive in that rational traders are price takers and have no market
power. In many markets, however, some rational traders have genuine market
power: a large hedge fund acting in a (relatively thin) derivative market, for
example, or a large oil producing country in a market for oil-related securities.
This short paper is a modest attempt to explore the e¤ects of bound-
edly rational trading on price uctuations when some rational traders have
market power. We analyze a simple example of speculative trade between a
large rational trader and boundedly rational speculators who follow a trad-
ing rule that conditions on the observed price history. We use this example
to show how rich patterns of asset price uctuations can emerge from very
simple boundedly rational trading rules, as a result of their interaction with
a large rational trader. Specically, although the speculatorstrading rule
neither follows a trend nor responds to price trends, the expected asset price
induced by the large traders optimal strategy displays bubble dynamics:
during periods of low volume of speculative trade, the expected price strictly
increases (decreases) when it is above (below) the fundamental value. This
means that during these periods, price discrepancies are positively correlated
in the short run and negatively correlated in the long run. The e¤ects are
suggestive of phenomena that have been documented in real-life nancial
markets (e.g., see Daniel et al. (1998)).
2 The Model
An asset is traded in a market in periods 0; 1; 2; :::. This asset has a constant
fundamental value equal to v. At the beginning of each period t, a long-lived
large trader chooses a quantity xt of the asset that he supplies to the market.
Let pt denote the price in period t and t = pt  v denote the deviation from
the fundamental value. Demand for the asset is generated by two groups of
agents:
Arbitrageurs. Their net demand in period t is yt = D(t). The function
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D : R ! R thus represents the arbitrageurs reactivity to current price
discrepancies. We assume that D is continuous, strictly decreasing and odd
(i.e., D () =  D ( )). Let (y) = D 1 (y) denote the inverse demand.
Noise speculators. Their net demand at period t, denoted zt, is a stochastic
function of the history of price deviations (s)t 1s=1. We will impose structure
on this function below.1
The market price pt is determined by a market clearing condition
xt = D(t) + zt:
The large traders information set at period t consists of the entire history of
price deviations ht = (1; ::; t 1). His prot in period t is xtt. He chooses
a trading strategy - namely, a function that assigns a supply quantity to
every information set - that maximizes his discounted expected prots. The
discount factor is 0 <  < 1.
The interpretation of the market structure is as follows. The large trader
can access a large external competitive market and buy or sell any quantity
at the fundamental price v, with no transaction cost. The implicit assump-
tion behind the arbitrageursdemand function is that they can also access
the external market, albeit with increasing transaction costs that cause their
net position to grow in absolute terms with the magnitude of the price dis-
crepancy. Thus, one could view this market as a local marketplace set up
by the large trader, who takes advantage of his privileged access to a global
competitive market. The large trader may have an incentive to manipulate
the local market price in anticipation of the noise speculatorsreaction, but
is mindful of the (limited) arbitrage activity that exploits deviations of the
local market price from the fundamental value.
Let us turn to the description of the noise speculators behavior. Fix
  0. For any given nite history ht = (1; ::; t 1), if t 1 > , let B (ht)
be the largest integer s for which sign(t k) = sign(t 1) and
t k >  for
all k = 1; :::; s. That is, B (ht) is the duration of the most recent episode
of persistent mispricing of magnitude greater than  in a given direction
relative to the fundamental value. If
t 1   or t = 0, set B (ht) = 0. We
assume that at every period t,
zt = "t + wt   wt 1
1Note that while the arbitrageursbehavior at period t reacts instantaneously to t, all
other traders react to the price history up to period t  1.
3
where "t is i.i.d according to a density f that is symmetric around zero,
wt = 0 when B(ht) < L, and wt = a  sign(t 1) when B(ht)  L, where
L > 2 is an integer and a 2 f 1; 1g. Let F be the cdf induced by f , and
assume F () < 1.
The interpretation of the process governing zt is as follows. Noise specu-
lators consist of one conventional noise trader and one naive speculator. The
former agents net demand at period t is "t. The latter agent takes a buy or
short position of one unit in each period; this position must be closed one pe-
riod later. He takes a non-zero position only after a su¢ ciently long sequence
of price discrepancies in the same direction and of su¢ cient magnitude. The
naive speculators net position at t is thus wt   wt 1. We say that a history
ht 1 is inactive if wt 2 = wt 1 = 0 and B(ht 1) < L. At an inactive history,
the naive speculator is waiting for a critical streak of price discrepancies
to form and does not take a non-zero position. Since we allow a to be either
positive or negative, we can capture two types of market sentiment. When
a =  1, it is apt to refer to the noise speculator as a fundamental trader,
because he acts at period t as if the market is about to correct the mispricing.
On the other hand, when a = 1, we may refer to the noise speculator as a
momentum trader. Our results can be extended to the case in which a is
stochastic. The large traders activity thus manipulates market sentiment in
the sense that it helps activating the perception that the market is about to
crash, or that it has gained momentum, etc.
If the large trader only faced arbitrageurs and conventional noise traders -
i.e., if wt = 0 for all t - he would be unable to make any speculative gain, and
his optimal policy would be to supply a zero quantity in every period. Thanks
to the naive speculator, the large trader has an incentive to manipulate the
market price, in order to induce the naive speculator to become active, and
then lean against him when he does.
3 The Result
Our objective is to provide a qualitative characterization of the price uc-
tuations that emerge from the large traders optimal net supply of the asset
in each period. We rst observe that the large trader faces a Markov deci-
sion problem. The naive speculators net demand at period t following the
history ht 1 is a deterministic function of the state dened by q(ht 1) =
((sign(t 2); B(ht 2)); ((sign(t 1); B(ht 1))). Since the behavior of arbi-
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trageurs and the conventional noise trader is entirely stationary, it follows
that the large traders dynamic optimization problem is Markovian w.r.t to
the set of states Q dened above. An inactive history ht 1 corresponds to a
state with B(ht 2); B(ht 1) < L.
Let V (q) be the value function given by a solution to this problem. Note
that the arbitrageursdemand function D, the density f and the naive spec-
ulatorstrading rule are all symmetric w.r.t the sign of price discrepancies.
Therefore, V is symmetric in the following sense. Let q = ((i; B); (j; B0)) and
q0 = (( i; B); ( j; B0)). Then, V (q) = V (q0) .
The following notation will be useful. Consider an inactive history ht 1
with B(ht 1) = B < L, and t 1 > 0. We denote the state that corresponds
to this history by B. We use F q to denote the cdf of zt conditional on
a history ht 1 that corresponds to the state q(ht 1). The expected price
deviation at period t given xt and a history ht 1 is thus
E
 
t j ht 1; xt = Z   xt   zt dF q(ht 1)(zt)
Note that this expression is decreasing in xt.
Proposition 1 (Bubble dynamics) Let x be a trading strategy that solves
the large traders problem. Consider two inactive histories ht and hs for which
B (hs) < B (ht) < L  1. Then,
E
 
t+1 j ht; x(ht) > E  s+1 j hs; x(hs) > 0 if t; s > 0
E
 
t+1 j ht; x(ht) < E  s+1 j hs; x(hs) < 0 if t; s < 0
Proof. We will only prove the rst row of inequalities, as the remaining set
is symmetric. Given an inactive history h, dene
 (x; h) = x
Z
(x  z) dF q(h) (z)
Note that, if E(z j h) = 0, then  (0; h) = 0 and  (x; h) < 0 whenever x 6= 0.
Consider the state B corresponding to an inactive history. Recall that
by denition, B < L. Note that V (B) > 0, since the myopic maximization
of 
 
x; B

leads with positive probability to a future history in which the
expectation of z is non-zero. Since the value function is symmetric w.r.t the
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sign of the history of price discrepancies, the Bellman equation for 0  B 
L  1 is
V (B) = max
x
f  x; B
+V (B+1)

1  F B (x D ())

+V (1)F 
B
(x D ( ))
+V (0)

F 
B
(x D ())  F B (x D ( ))

g
Now,
V (0) = 
 
x(0); 0

+V (1)

1  F 0  x(0) D ()+ F 0  x(0) D ( )
+V (0)

F 
0  
x(0) D ()  F 0  x(0) D ( )
Since  (1; x(1))  0, if V (1)  V (0), by simple substitution it is easy
to verify that V (0)  0, a contradiction. Thus, V (1) > V (0). Now let B^
be the smallest B  L  1 such that V (B+1)  V (B). Then,
V (B^)  

x(B^); B^

+ V (B^)
which implies V (B^)  0, a contradiction. Thus, V (B+1) > V (B) for any
0  B  L  1.
Since  (; 1) and F 1 (z) are symmetric around zero and V (2) > V (1),
we have that x(1)  0. Otherwise, choosing  x(1) would yield a higher
payo¤. By denition, for 0 < B < L  1,
V (B)    x(B+1); B+ V (B+1)1  F B  x(B+1) D ()
+V (1)F 
B  
x(B+1) D ( )
+V (0)

F 
B  
x(B+1) D ()  F B  x(B+1) D ( )
and
V (B+1)    x(B); B+1+ V (B+2)1  F B+1  x(B) D ()
+V (1)F 
B+1  
x(B) D ( )
+V (0)

F 
B+1  
x(B) D ()  F B+1  x(B) D ( )
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Thus, since F 
B+1
(x) = F 
B
(x) for any x 2 R,
1  F B  x(B) D ()  V (B+1)  V (B+2) 
1  F B  x(B+1) D ()  V (B+1)  V (B+2)
which implies that x(B)  x(B+1) as V (B+1) < V (B+2). To establish
the strictness of the inequality, note that since V (B) < V (B+1), the rst-
order necessary conditions fail when x(B) = x(B+1).
Proposition 1 describes the evolution of expected prices after consecu-
tive periods of mispricing (above a minimal magnitude) in a given direction.
Expected prices deviate further from the fundamental value as the duration
of mispricing becomes longer. The intuition for this result is simple. The
large trader benets from speculative trade only because he can anticipate
when the naive speculator will submit non-zero demand. As a streak of price
deviations in a given direction is formed, the large trader knows that the
moment in which the naive speculator becomes active gets nearer. If the
noise traders random demand shocks terminate this episode before the crit-
ical date arrives, the opportunity for a speculative gain is lost and the large
trader must wait for the next streak to form. Therefore, the large trader has
a stronger incentive to prolong the streak, and consequently the expected
price deviation becomes larger.
An apt analogy for this predicament is the Greek myth of King Sisyphus
rolling a boulder up a hill. Should the boulder fall before Sisyphus reaches
the hilltop, he will have to go down and start all over again. Introducing
economic reasoning into the myth, Sisyphuss incentive to prevent the boulder
from falling is greater as he approaches the hilltop, because the opportunity
cost of dropping it becomes larger. Similarly, the large trader has a greater
incentive to manipulate the price as the duration of mispricing increases,
because the opportunity cost of terminating a streak rises. This translates
into an increasingly larger bias relative to the fundamental. Thus, even
though the traders behavior during this phase neither obeys a trend nor
responds to one, their interaction with large trader causes the emergence of
patterns of increasing or decreasing prices.
A numerical illustration
Suppose that the arbitrageursdemand is given by D(t) =  t, and that
"t is uniformly distributed over [ k; k]. As to the naive speculator, let  = 0
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and a =  1 (i.e., the naive speculator is a fundamental trader). The
following graphs illustrate bubble dynamics by showing jE ( j h; x(h)j as a
function of B (h), under various values of k and L, for  = 0:99.
1 2 3 4
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
k=1
k=2
Figure 1: jE ( j h; x(h)j as a function of B (h) for
L = 5:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
k=1
k=2
Figure 2: jE ( j h; x(h)j as a function of B (h) for
L = 10.
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Price deviations increase at an accelerated rate as the bubble is prolonged.
Note that when k increases, the e¤ect becomes muted. The intuition is that
as conventional noise traders behavior becomes more unpredictable, it be-
comes less protable for the large trader to lean against the naive speculators
expected attack of the bubble.
Short-run and long-run correlation of price discrepancies
Our last observation applies Proposition 1 to characterize short-run and long-
run correlations of price discrepancies. Specically, when wt = 0, t >  and
B(ht) < L, the price deviation is likely to persist at t + 1, in the sense that
t+1 > 0 with probability greater than 1
2
. Put di¤erently, our model implies
positive short-run correlation of price discrepancies during periods of low
speculative trade volume.
The picture is di¤erent in the long run. The process governing zt is a
nite-state Markov process which treats positive and negative price discrep-
ancies symmetrically. Therefore, the invariant measure over the state space
is ergodic, and the long-run average price deviation induced by the optimal
policy is zero. In other words, the large traders interventions only a¤ect
temporary deviations of the asset price from its fundamental value, but they
do not a¤ect its long-run average. Any correlation of price discrepancies
vanishes in the long run as deviations in any direction eventually dissipate.
4 Concluding Remarks
Our objective in this short paper was merely to illustrate that the combi-
nation of rational traders with market power and price-taking, boundedly
rational speculators can generate price uctuation patterns of interest. How-
ever, we believe it also sheds some light on an ancient debate regarding the
role of rational speculators in nancial markets. Some argue that specula-
tors sow instability and create excess volatility, whereas others argue that
speculators have a stabilizing role, as they bring prices back to fundamen-
tals by spotting arbitrage opportunities. Our model synthesizes both views.
Even if the large rational trader did not exist, episodes of persistent mis-
pricing would occur spontaneously from time to time, and this would lead
to large price uctuations due to the activity of the naive speculator. The
rational traders strategic, forward-looking behavior in our model can make
these episodes more likely to happen, thereby raising the frequency of large
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price movements. Nevertheless, the amplitude of the large price movements
due to the naive speculators activity is reduced, because the rational trader
leans against him. Although the large rational trader precipitates episodes
of large volatility, he curbs their amplitude when they occur. Thus, if we
view price volatility as a problem, then rational speculators are both part
of the problem and part of its solution.
Related literature
There is a huge literature in behavioral nance that addresses price uctua-
tions due to the presence of noise/naive traders. Our paper adds a dimension
to this literature by introducing rational, forward-looking traders with mar-
ket power. As a result, our modeling style is di¤erent from the competitive
equilibrium methodology that characterizes this literature.
Our paper is also related to a smaller literature that asks whether a
large rational speculator can make prots in a market for a nancial asset
or a storable commodity by manipulating prices (see Hart (1977), Hart and
Kreps (1986), Jarrow (1992)). This literature has not addressed e¤ects on
price dynamics, and has treated the behavior of traders that the large specu-
lator faces as a black box without deriving it from behavioral rules. The only
exceptions we are aware of are Mei, Wu and Zhou (2004) and Rubinstein and
Spiegler (2008). The former paper analyzes a nite-horizon model with one
large manipulator, a population of rational arbitrageurs and a set of traders
prone to the disposition e¤ect (a tendency to avoid selling losing assets),
and derive some asset price anomalies. The latter paper analyzes the in-
teraction between a large rational trader and boundedly rational speculators
whose trading rule responds to the ergodic price distribution. As a result, the
Rubinstein-Spiegler model cannot be reduced to a Markov decision problem.
Finally, there is a large literature on information-based manipulation of mar-
ket prices, where a large informed trader exploits informational asymmetries
and the presence of noise traders to make speculative prots at the expense
of rational, uninformed traders (Kyle (1985), Allen and Gale (1992) are key
references in this literature).
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